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tributed to all in-state osteopaths and
recent graduates who pass the osteopathic exam.
Also at the October meeting, the
Board's staff announced that during the
last fiscal year, BOE used approximately
94% of the $396,000 allocated. The remaining amount will go to BOE's reserve
account.
At its October meeting, BOE met
with various osteopathic-related organizations to discuss the present state of the
osteopathic profession in California.
Those present discussed the large number of osteopathic-related bills which
were passed during the last legislative
session but were vetoed by Governor
Deukmejian. BOE expressed interest in
working with other groups in order to
get a fairer share of postgraduate resources that are allocated in this state.
Those present agreed to organize efforts
and work toward getting pro-osteopath
legislation reintroduced during the I 989
session. BOE also contemplated meeting
with various members of the Governor's
staff in order to explain and/ or emphasize the need to recognize the osteopathic
profession as an equal to the medical
doctor profession.
FUTURE MEETINGS:
April I in Pomona.
June 23 in Pomona.

PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION
Executive Director: Victor Weisser
President: G. Mitchell Wilk
(415) 557-1487
The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) was created in I 9 I I to
regulate privately-owned utilities and
ensure reasonable rates and service for
the public. Today the PUC regulates the
service and rates of more than 25,000
privately-owned utilities and transportation companies. These include gas, electric, local and long distance telephone,
radio-telephone, water, steam heat utilities and sewer companies; railroads,
buses, trucks, and vessels transporting
freight or passengers; and wharfingers,
carloaders, and pipeline operators. The
Commission does not regulate city- or
district-owned utilities or mutual water
companies.
It is the duty of the Commission to
see that the public receives adequate
service at rates which are fair and reasonable, both to customers and the utilities.
Overseeing this effort are five commis-
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sioners appointed by the Governor with
Senate approval. The commissioners
serve staggered six-year terms.
In late 1987, the PUC renamed three
of its organizational units to clarify their
roles and responsibilities. The former
Evaluation and Compliance Division,
which implements Commission decisions,
monitors utility compliance with Commission orders, and advises the PUC on
utility matters, is now called the Commission Advisory and Compliance Division. The former Public Staff Division,
charged with representing the long-term
interests of all utility ratepayers in PUC
rate proceedings, is now the Division of
Ratepayer Advocates. The former Policy
and Planning Division is now the Division
of Strategic Planning.
The PUC is available to answer consumer questions about the regulation of
public utilities and transportation companies. However, it urges consumers to
seek information on rules, service, rates,
or fares directly from the utility. If satisfaction is not received, the Commission's
Consumer Affairs Branch (CAB) is available to investigate the matter. The CAB
will take up the matter with the company
and attempt to reach a reasonable settlement. If a customer is not satisfied by
the informal action of the CAB staff,
the customer may file a formal complaint.
On December 19, G. Mitchell Wilk
was elected President of the PUC by a
unanimous vote of his colleagues. Wilk
was appointed to the Commission by
Governor Deukmejian in 1986 after serving on the Governor's staff. Wilk
succeeds Stanley W. Hulett.
MAJOR PROJECTS:
Realignment of Residential Energy
Rates Begins. As required by SB 987
(Dills) (Chapter 212, Statutes of 1988),
the PUC began allowing utilities to raise
baseline rates while lowering "second
tier" rates. (See CRLR Vol. 8, No. 4
(Fall 1988) p. 120 and Vol. 8, No. 3
(Summer 1988) p. 127 for background
information.)
Adjustments approved by the November I, 1988 deadline were modest and
reflected a desire to resolve general rate
cases and other matters before proposing
extensive and fundamental changes in
rate structure. With the exception of
Southern California Edison's 10% baseline increase and a 8. 7% "second tier"
decrease, all other utilities received adjustments of 4% or less.
SB 987 (Dills) also requires a program
to aid low-income ratepayers in order to
mitigate the effects of increased baseline
rates. The bill does not specify the nature

of the aid; it could take the form of
weatherization programs, deferred billing, direct subsidies, or any other
measure or combination of measures approved by the PUC. A prehearing conference was scheduled for December 28 in
San Francisco before Administrative Law
Judge Greg Wheatland.
PUC Approves Settlement of Diablo
Canyon Costs. On December 19, the
Commission unanimously approved and
adopted the settlement of the Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant case agreed
to by Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(PG&E), the state Attorney General, and
the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA), with slight modifications
to preserve future PUC discretion. (See
CRLR Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) pp.
118-19; Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1988)
p. 133; and Vol. 8, No. I (Winter 1988)
p. 106 for background information.)
The decision is not binding on future
Commissions, but is expected to be upheld if conditions remain substantially
the same.
The parties describe the settlement
as one which shifts the risk of poor
plant performance from ratepayers to
shareholders while giving the utility an
opportunity to recoup more of its investment. Under traditional ratemaking, the
PUC would have determined how much
of PG&E's $5.5 billion investment in
Diablo Canyon was reasonably incurred
and allowed the utility to earn a return
on that amount over the thirty-year estimated useful life of the plant. During
the thirty-year period, ratepayers would
bear the cost of operating the plant and
the risk that rates would be raised if it
did not generate sufficient power and/ or
revenue.
In contrast, under this settlement ratepayers will purchase whatever energy is
produced, but the price will not vary with
the efficiency of the plant. PG&E's recovery of its investment is based on
Diablo Canyon performing at the national average efficiency rate for similar
nuclear power plants. If the plant operates at the average, PG&E is expected
to recover approximately $3.5 billion
over the 28-year term of the settlement.
If Diablo Canyon performs more efficiently than the average, PG&E could recover
its entire $5.5 billion investment. If the
plant performs significantly less efficiently than the average, PG&E might recover
closer to the $1.1 billion originally suggested by the ORA. This so-called "performance-based" ratemaking gives
PG&E an incentive to increase investment recovery by operating the plant
more efficiently.
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The settlement contains additional
terms which mitigate PG&E shareholder
risk. If the PUC orders the plant shut
down because it produces no ratepayer
benefits, PG&E may request "abandonment payments." This compensation is
$3 billion in year one of the plant's life,
decreasing by $100 million per year to
zero after thirty years. In addition,
PG&E may request "floor payments" if
plant efficiency drops 22% below the
national average. The floor payments,
plus interest, are subject to repayment
out of half the revenue earned while the
plant efficiency is 2% or more above the
national average. In the event PG&E
abandons the plant after receiving floor
payments, the PUC may refund payments
in excess of abandonment payments to
ratepayers. If the plant operates for the
full length of the settlement period, however, PG&E will not have to repay any
floor payments. Despite the provisions
to mitigate risk, it is unlikely that PG&E
can recover its entire $5.5 billion investment unless it actually operates Diablo
Canyon more efficiently than the national
average for the majority of the settlement period.
Opponents of the settlement fear that
a shift in cost from ratepayers to shareholders may encourage PG&E to disregard safety to maximize profits. The
PUC contends that a shareholder loss
caused by inadequate safety is sufficient
incentive to operate the plant properly.
To further allay opponents' fears,
the settlement provides for a three-member Safety Committee funded by ratepayers. Nominations for the Committee
membership will be made by the PUC
President; the Dean of the School of
Engineering, University of California
at Berkeley; and PG&E. From the nominees, the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Chair of the California
Energy Commission will each appoint a
member. The Committee will have access
to the plant and plant documents and
will submit an annual report of observations and recommendations to the
Governor, the Energy Commission, and
the PUC.
An appeal of the PUC's decision is
expected. (See supra report on TURN.)
Opponents contend the settlement does
not adequately shift the risk of poor
plant performance and the proposed
compensation is not sufficiently performance-based.
SDG&E General Rate Case. In concluding the triennial San Diego Gas and
Electric Company (SDG&E) General
Rate Case, the PUC recently approved
a I 0. 7% decrease in electricity rates
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for residential customers and a 0.7%
increase in natural gas rates for nonresidential customers. (See CRLR Vol.
8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) p. 119 for background information.) This action resulted from three other decisions in
addition to the General Rate Case order.
These decisions include a forecast of
SDG&E's energy-related expenses, the
adoption of a 13% return on equity as
reasonable for California's major energy
utilities in 1989, and a final decision
on SDG&E's responsibility for postcommercial operating costs for Units 2
and 3 of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
In addition to rate adjustments, the
PUC approved a reduction of the baseline allowance for gas customers starting
May I, 1989. (See supra Realignment of
Energy Rates.) The establishment of a
late payment charge beginning April I,
1989, on all non-residential bills not paid
within thirty days of the billing date was
also approved. Further, the PUC is requiring SDG&E to encourage femaleand minority-owned businesses to compete for utility contracts by providing
technical assistance in meeting loan and
insurance requirements at competitive rates.
Several groups were awarded intervenor compensation in the General Rate
Case. Utility Consumers' Action Network (UCAN) received $44,907; the
Center for Public Interest Law was
awarded $3,582; and Rate Watchers received $2,038. Public Advocates was also
declared eligible to request similar compensation.

AT&T Communications Rate Reduction.
In a three-part decision issued December
19, the PUC ordered AT&T to issue a
one-time credit of $110 million to all
customers to offset overcollections in
the first part of 1988. (See CRLR Vol.
8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) pp. 119-20 for background information.) AT&T will not advertise the credit but was scheduled to
explain to customers why they are receiving the credit through an insert in
their bills for the January period.
The Commission also ordered a 9%
decrease in intrastate rates as part of a
seven-year program to reflect reduced
costs paid to local phone companies.
The rates will decline proportionally as
the costs of providing a given service
decline, thus preserving the link between
rates and costs.
Finally, the PUC granted AT&T's
application for pricing flexibility. AT&T
may now adjust rates for its services
within 15% of those currently authorized.
This should allow AT&T to respond to
market changes and compete for the
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long distance telephone service market
while providing new technologies and
customer services.
By granting flexibility, the PUC is
responding to AT &T's position in a
competitive market, but the Commission
has maintained control by imposing
some restrictions on the grant. AT&T
must maintain statewide average rates;
introduce new services statewide; make
no more than four rate revisions per
year; not restrict resale and sharing of
its services; not abandon any service or
initiate a new service except by formal
application to the PUC; and not seek to
withdraw any service from a community
on a geographically discriminatory basis.
The PUC will monitor the pricing
flexibility to measure the benefit or harm
to consumers and competitors and will
rescind the grant or allow greater flexibility as necessary.

Pacific Bell Rate of Return Adjustments. In response to a recent PUC
order, Pacific Bell will reduce rates in a
15% surcredit on residential phone bills
for the first four months of 1989 and
then 5% after that. This reduction will
fix its 1989 rate of return at 11.34%;
PacBell had requested an 11.96% rate
of return.
Between general rate cases every
three years, the PUC adjusts base rates
to offset the effects of changes in expenses due to inflation. Decreases in
estimated expenses for 1988 and 1989
and refunds from rates collected for
income tax are partially offset by losses
resulting from revised accounting methods.
Cellular Phone Regulation. The PUC
has begun an investigation to determine
how to effectively regulate the fast-growing cellular radiotelephone industry.
Current regulation of this five-year-old
industry may not be adequate to meet
customer needs. The Commission must
grapple with the sometimes conflicting
goals of protecting consumers from overpricing and ensuring rapid development
of new technologies.
While Los Angeles is the largest
market in the nation, and one-fifth of
the total number of subscribers in the
United States are in California, rates for
service in California are among the highest in the nation. Without meaningful
price competition, the cellular carriers
are not implementing price reductions
which correspond to the increased number of cellular radiotelephone users.
In Phase I of the investigation beginning in January 1989, the PUC requests
interested parties to submit comments
on broad regulatory issues. The Commission's Advisory and Compliance Div-
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ision will submit a plan for developing
information on cellular costs and financial performance. Phase II of the investigation will focus on more specific questions related to the wholesale and retail
markets and connection to local exchange
carriers.
Customer-Owned Pay Telephone
(COPT). In a November 23 order, the
Commission awarded non-utility payphone providers six cents for every coinless call made from COPT payphones.
The local exchange carriers (LECs) were
ordered to work out a plan for reimbursement by mid-February. Additionally,
COPT companies will be able to collect
a ten-cent fee for credit card calls which
the PUC had previously granted. In the
past, COPT providers had been unable
to collect this charge from the LECs.
This decision provides interim relief
until the Commission issues a final order
in its current investigation into COPT
services and payphone operations. (See
CRLR Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1988) p. 125
and Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1988) p. 98
for background information on COPTs.)
Hearings on Trucking Regulation.
On November 7, the PUC began formal
hearings in its review of the regulation
of California's general freight industry,
entitled In the Matter of the Regulation
of General Freight Transportation by
Truck. The proceeding stems from a
PUC en bane informational hearing on
trucking regulations which occurred last
March in San Francisco. (See CRLR
Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1988) p. 120-21 for
background information.)
Traditionally, the PUC applied minimum rate tariff regulation to all regulated carriers. During the 1970s, it modified
its regulatory approach in many trucking
sectors either by deregulating them or
by requiring carriers to file their own
cost-based tariffs with the Commission.
However, in 1980, the PUC reversed
course and instead has imposed over the
subsequent eight years a complex system
of "reregulation." Some areas of trucking were subject to increased competition
while others maintained the entry barriers and minimum rate structures. The
PUC now has a minimum rate regulation
system in the traditional mode for dump
trucks, livestock carriers, household
goods carriers, and substantially for
cement carriers; while general freight
carriers operate under an "IFT" system
(individually filed tariffs). Under that
system, each carrier is allowed to file its
own tariffs and contracts with the PUC
based on cost of service, which may be
changed only where the carrier can justify
changes as profitable.
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Proponents of continued freight regulation include the California Trucking
Association and the Teamsters, as well
as several ad hoc groups of small associations which are part of the freight industry. These proponents of trucking
regulation, who are predominantly within
or under contract to the trucking industry, justify price regulation by citing their
fear of "destructive competition." They
further argue that trucking is particularly
amenable to "price wars"; that is, the
predatory tactics of some entrepreneurs
to drive others out of business by going
below cost. The resultant competitive
struggle at price levels at or below
marginal costs usually means service
diminution, a refusal to serve rural areas,
and cutbacks on safety. In addition, proponents of trucking regulation believe
that destructive rate competition creates
a disruptive pattern of quick entry and
exit from the marketplace, which adversely affects shipper ability to plan for their
transportation needs.
Opponents of the existing freight regulatory scheme include the Division of
Ratepayer Advocates, the Center for
Public Interest Law, Ralph Nader's Public Citizen organization, the California
Coalition for Trucking Deregulation, the
California Manufacturing Association,
a coalition of shippers which includes
corporations such as Long's Drugs, and
several small trucking firms. These opponents contend that the current regulatory scheme, including industry rate
proposals, minimum price floors, and
PUC review, is conceptually flawed.
They believe there is little nexus between safety, service, or other external
cost concerns and the imposition of minimum rates. The PUC could fully enforce
rules to ameliorate any such harms by
means other than intervention into the
market to artificially increase rates.
Opponents of the current system favor
targeted regulation, an end to minimum
price floors, and deregulation of rates
and entry, while continuing to impose
safety regulations. They argue that the
existing regulatory structure of the general freight industry serves merely to
benefit the trucking industry's profit
margin, while having little regard for
consumer welfare.
At this writing, hearings on the regulation of general freight transportation by
truck are being held on a daily basis
with nonstop testimony. The hearings
were targeted to end in the latter half of
January. The administrative law judge
presiding over the proceeding will then
submit a recommended decision, upon
which a thirty-day public comment period

will commence. After the public comment period ends, the opinion will be
considered by the Commission, which
may adopt, amend, or reject the ALJ's
recommendation.
LEGISLATION:
SB 52 (Rosenthal) was introduced
on December 5, and would amend Public
Utilities Code section 854 to prohibit
any person or corporation from taking
any significant action to acquire control,
either directly or indirectly, of any public utility without first securing approval
from the PUC. The bill would also require the PUC to consider ten specific
factors before granting approval, including the effect on ratepayers, shareholders,
and public utility employees, as well as
the effect on state and local economies.
The bill would also require the PUC to
request an Attorney General's opinion
regarding the effect of an acquisition on
competition.
SB 52 is an urgency bill prompted
by Southern California Edison's attempt
to acquire SDG&E. The utilities filed an
application with the PUC on December
16 for approval of the acquisition. At
this writing, SB 52 is pending in the
Senate Committee on Energy and Public
Utilities.
SB 53 (Rosenthal) would amend sections 852 and 853 of, and add section
856 to, the Public Utilities Code. Existing law prohibits a public utility from
purchasing or acquiring the capital stock
of any other public utility in California
without PUC authorization. This bill
would extend that prohibition to any
subsidiary or affiliate of, or corporation
holding a controlling interest in, a public
utility. This bill is also pending in the
Senate Committee on Energy and Public
Utilities.
FUTURE MEETINGS:
The full Commission usually meets
every other Wednesday in San Francisco.
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The State Bar of California was
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codified in the California Constitution
by Article VI, section 9. The State Bar
was established as a public corporation
within the judicial branch of government,
and membership is a requirement for all
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